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Chamblee: IRS Acted within Its Authority in Determining That Racially Discr

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE-TAX EXEMPTIONS-IRS
Acted Within Its Authority in Determining That Racially
Discriminatory Non-Profit Private Schools Are Not
"Charitable" Institutions Entitled to Tax-Exempt
Status

-

Bob Jones University v. United States,
U.S. _, 103 S, Ct. 2017, 76 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1983).

Bob Jones University, a non-profit private school, denied blacks admission based upon a sincerely held religious belief.' On November 30, 1970,
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) notified the University of its revised
policy on tax-exemption 2 and announced its decision to challenge the taxexempt status of racially discriminatory private schools.3 In 1971 the IRS
issued a revenue ruling which denied federal income tax-exemption to private schools that do not maintain a nondiscriminatory policy.4 Although
1. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, -.U.S....-, - 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2022, 76 L. Ed.
2d 157, 166 (1983). Bob Jones University, located in Greenville, South Carolina, genuinely
believes that the Bible forbids interracial dating and interracial marriage and based upon
such belief, the school denies admission to applicants who engage in or are known to advocate such practices. See id at 103 S. Ct. at 2022-23, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 165-66.
2. See id. at 103 S. Ct. at 2023, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 166. The IRS' revised policy followed a preliminary injunction issued by the District Court for the District of Columbia in
Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127 (D.D.C. 1970), app. dismissed sub nora. Cannon v.
Green, 398 U.S. 956 (1970), in which the court prohibited the IRS from according tax-exempt status to discriminatory private schools in Mississippi. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United
States, __ U.S. _ _ 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2021, 76 L. Ed. 2d 157, 165 (1983).
3. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S. __ _
103 S. Ct. 2017, 2023, 76 L. Ed.
2d 157, 166-67 (1983). In a related case, the IRS determined that Goldsboro Christian
Schools were not an organization fulfilling a charitable purpose under section 501(c)(3) of
the Internal Revenue Code and therefore were denied tax-exempt status. See id. at _ 103
S. Ct. at 2024, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 168. Goldsboro Christian Schools, a group of non-profit
private schools which maintain racially discriminatory admission policies, filed suit in the
District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina. See id. at _, 103 S. Ct. at 2024, 76
L. Ed. 2d at 168. The district court upheld the IRS determination in Goldsboro Christian
Schools, Inc. v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314, 1320 (E.D.N.C. 1977). The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court in Goldsboro Christian Schools, Inc.
v. United States, 644 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1981) (per curiam). The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari in both cases, Bob Jones University and Goldsboro Christian
Schools. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S. __, - 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2025, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 157, 169 (1983).
4. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S. , 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2022, 76 L. Ed.
2d 157, 165 (1983). The Revenue Ruling 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, was encouraged by the
national commitment to halt discrimination. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S.
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the University's revised admissions policy, enacted May 29, 1975, permitted enrollment of blacks, the University continued to deny admission to
applicants who engaged in or advocated interracial dating or marriage. 6
On January 19, 1976, the IRS revoked the University's tax-exempt status,
effective as of December 1, 1970, and the University responded by bringing
suit to recover taxes paid to the IRS.7 The United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina ruled that the IRS had exceeded the scope
of its authority and had violated the University's constitutional rights
under the first amendment. 8 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ruled that the IRS acted within the scope of its authority in
revoking the tax-exempt status of the University because, under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal9 Revenue Code, the University was not acting as a
"charitable institution." The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.' o Held-Affirmed The Internal Revenue Service acted within its
authority in determining that racially discriminatory non-profit private
schools are not "charitable" institutions entitled to tax-exempt status. 1

__, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2022, 76 L. Ed. 2d 157, 165 (1983). Based upon the Revenue Ruling,

the IRS concluded that racially discrimintory non-profit private schools cannot qualify for
tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. See id at - 103 S.
Ct. at 2022, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 165. Furthermore, those who make contributions to such discriminatory institutions will no longer be afforded federal income tax deductions under section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2022, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 165.
5. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S. _ _, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2023, 76 L. Ed.
2d 157, 167 (1983).
6. See id at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2023, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 167. Prior to the date of formal
revocation, the University brought an action in 1971 to enjoin the IRS. See id at -, 103 S.
Ct. at 2023, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 167. This action culminated in the case of Bob Jones Univ. v.
Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1974), in which the Supreme Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act
of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 742 1(a) (1970), denied the University any judicial
review before the payment of taxes. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S. .
103 S.Ct. 2017, 2023, 76 L. Ed. 2d 157, 167 (1983).
7. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S. - _, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2023, 76 L. Ed.
2d 157, 167 (1983).
8. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 890, 907 (D.S.C. 1978). The
Court ordered the IRS to reimburse the $21 refund per employee claimed by the University.
See id at 907.
9. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 639 F.2d 147, 151-55 (1981). The court of
appeals also rejected petitioner's claim that revocation of its tax-exempt status violated the
establishment clause and the free exercise clause of the first amendment. See id 153-55.
10. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S. ., 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2025, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 157, 169 (1983).
II. See id at , 103 S.Ct. at 2036, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 182. The Court limited the effect of
its decision to religious schools and did not specifically decide whether there should be a
distinction between public and private schools. See id at __ 103 S.Ct. at 2035 n.29, 76 L.
Ed. 2d at 182 n.29. Furthermore, the Court declared that its decision did not deal with the
issue of denial of tax-exempt status to "churches or other purely religious institutions." See
id at __ 103 S.Ct. at 2035 n.29, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 181 n.29.
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Congress has created numerous administrative agencies to interpret, implement, and enforce the laws which it has enacted.' 2 The statutes which
establish such administrative agencies also define the parameters of the
agency's authority. 1 3 When an agency exceeds the scope of its authority,
certain constitutional mandates are threatened.' 4 Administrative agencies
cannot act in any manner which would divest the legislative and judicial
branches of their constitutional powers. 5 With regard to Congress, an
agency violates the Constitution if it attempts to create the laws, since only
Congress is vested with such authority.16 Courts thus are concerned with
limiting an agency's authority to those areas in which the agency has statutory power.' 7
12. See Barfield v. Byrd, 320 F.2d 455, 457 (5th Cir. 1963) (Congress vested with authority to create agencies to "administer and enforce" laws which it creates), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 928 (1964). See generally PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS UNIT, OFFICE OF FEDERAL REGISTER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1982/83 (1982) (comprehensive list of

all governmental administrative agencies created by Congress).
13. See Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 456 U.S. 88, 113 (1976) (statutory directive creating agency is subject of court's inquiry); see also D. NELSON, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES OF
THE USA 173 (1964) (agencies dependent on courts which look to statutes to determine
enforcement of agency's order).
14. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) (Constitution prohibits Congress from delegating essential legislative functions); Humphrey's Ex'r v.
United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (Congress has authority to establish "quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies" but Constitution demands each branch of government remain free from control or influence); see also F. COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND

THE COURTS 31-32 (1982) (violation of "essential constitutional precept" for agency to act in
manner depriving legislature or courts of "their constitutional prerogatives").
15. See F. COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 31-32 (1982) (ad-

ministrative agencies cannot exercise constitutional powers reserved to legislative and judicial branches).
16. See, e.g., Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) (only
Congress can exercise legislative functions); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421
(1935) (certain legislative functions vested in Congress cannot be transferred); Hampton &
Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928) (important distinction between authority to
execute laws and authority to make the laws); see also Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v.
Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1936) ("the power to make law" cannot be exercised by
administrative agency nor delegated by Congress to administrative agency).
17. See Village of Silver Lake v,Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 275 N.W.2d 119, 122
(Wis. Ct. App. 1978) (administrative agencies have "no common law power," only powers
possessed "are either expressly conferred or necessarily implied from the four corners of the
statute under which it operates"); see also Community Television v. Gottfried, - U.S.
103 S.Ct. 885, 893 n.17, 74 L. Ed. 2d 705, 717 n.17 (1983) (general duty of agency "to
enforce the public interest" does not dictate that agency attempt to enforce legislation
outside agency's authority); NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976)
(Congress' intent in directing Federal Power Commission to be guided by "public interest"
did not encompass commissioner's taking original jurisdiction of processing charges of unfair labor practices on part of regulatees). See generally Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases
During 1979, 32 AD. L. REV. 411, 413 (1980) (limiting agencies to statutory limits is "princi-
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Courts also scrutinize agency actions justified under the guise of promotion of the general welfare.'" With respect to the Federal Power Commission (FPC), the Supreme Court decided that Congress, in stipulating that
the FPC is to be guided by the "public interest,"' 9 did not intend the commission to eliminate discrimination. 0 This holding reflects the rule consistently enumerated by the Supreme Court that the use of the words
"public interest" in regulatory statutes does not authorize the agency to
embark on a mission to promote the general public welfare. 2 '
In the area of taxation, the Internal Revenue Service, like other administrative agencies, must act within the scope of its authority.2 2 Congress, by
statute, delegated to the Secretary of the Treasury the power to enforce
and administer the tax laws 3 and created a Commissioner of the Internal
pie administrative law function" of courts). In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, the Supreme
Court of the United States reviewed the authority of the Civil Service Commission. See
Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 91 (1976). The question presented was whether
the Commission could bar noncitizens, including lawfully admitted resident aliens, from
participating in federal civil service employment. See id at 98-99. The Court stated that the
Commission, like other administrative agencies, must utilize its expertise and explain the
reasoning for its decision. See id at 115. The Court declared that the Commission, or any
agency, exceeds its scope of authority when it acts in "foreign affairs, for treaty negotiations,
for establishing immigration quotas or conditions of entry, or for naturalization policies."
Id at 114. The Court concluded that only Congress and the President may have the constitutional power to act as the Commission had done, since the maintenance of efficient federal
service is the Commission's only concern. See id at 114. Furthermore, actions of the Commission are under the supervision of the President, as dictated by statute. See id at 114 n.47;
5 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a), 3301(1) (1976 & Supp. V 1982).
18. See NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 665 (1976).
19. See, e.g., NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 671 (1976) (FPC to
establish "just and reasonable rates in the public interest"); 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (1976) ("the
business of transporting natural gas for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a
public interest"); 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1976) ("the business of transmitting and selling electric
energy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest").
20. See NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976) (Court declared
that Congress gave FPC authority to promote just and reasonable rates in the public interest,
but not to eradicate discrimination).
21. See, e.g., NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976) ("public
interest" in statute does not give power to FPC to create or promote general welfare); New
Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 432 (1970) (Commission does not have responsibility
of "public interest" apart from maintenance of adequate rail transportation system in "public interest"); United States v. Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 230 (1939) (Commissioner charged
with efficient maintenance of rail transportation system not public interest); see also Texas v.
United States, 292 U.S. 522, 531 (1934) (statute's reference to "public interest" does not
dictate that Commission advance general public welfare).
22. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7801-7810 (1976 & Supp. V. 1982) (statutes define scope of authority of officers of Internal Revenue Service).
23. See 26 U.S.C. § 7801(a) (1976 & Supp. V. 1982). The Constitution confers on Congress the power to tax. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. I. The sixteenth amendment to the
Constitution establishes the power of Congress "to lay and collect taxes on incomes." See
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Revenue to perform "such duties and [exercise such] powers as may be
prescribed by the Secretary."2 4 Important duties and powers of the IRS
include the issuance of regulations, 25 revenue rulings, 26 and letter rul28
ings.27 Although treasury regulations have the force of law, courts will
not enforce the regulations if they are inconsistent with the Internal Revenue Code.29 Treasury regulations carry more authority than revenue rulings because the regulations are promulgated under the guidance of the
Secretary of the Treasury.3 ° Courts, however, do accord weight to revenue

U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. Taxation is ultimately a legislative function. See National Cable
Television Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974). Congress cannot delegate
legislative functions vested in it by the Constitution. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (Congress vested with certain legislative functions which it cannot transfer). Congress may, however, delegate authority or discretion as to the administration of the laws which it creates.
See Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928) (important distinction between delegation of authority to make laws and conferring authority as to the execution of
law).
24. 26 U.S.C. § 7802 (1976). The IRS is divided into three parts: a national office
located in Washington, D.C.; seven regional offices, each with its own commissioner; and 60
district offices, each with its own director. See PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS UNIT, OFFICE OF
THE FEDERAL REGISTER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1982/83 (434-35)
(1982).
25. See 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(a)(1) (1983) (regulations are "prescribed by the Commissioner and approved by the Secretary or his delegate"). The purpose of publication of regulations is to effectuate a "uniform application" of the tax laws. See id § 601.601(d)(1)
(1983). If a treasury regulation changes congressional intent, it will be held void. See World
Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. Unted States, 471 F.2d 247, 250 (8th Cir. 1983).
26. See Tax Analysts & Advocates v. IRS, 362 F. Supp. 1292, 1302 (D.D.C. 1973) (revenue rulings "are formal, published interpretations of the tax laws and are issued by the
IRS"). Revenue rulings are published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin for the purpose of
informing and guiding the taxpayer and are issued only by the National Office of the IRS.
See id at 1302. The purpose of publication of revenue rulings is to "assist taxpayers in
maintaining maximum voluntary compliance" with the nation's tax laws. See 26 C.F.R.
§ 601.601(d)(2)(iii) (1982).
27. See United States v. Weber Paper Co., 320 F.2d 199, 201 (8th Cir. 1963). When a
taxpayer requests a particular interpretation of a secton of the Internal Revenue Code, the
IRS will issue a letter ruling interpreting or explaining that section. See id at 201.
28. See Estate of J.0. Willett v. Comm'r, 365 F.2d 760, 761 (5th Cir. 1966) (treasury
regulations ordinarily have force of law).
29. See Comm'r v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948) (unless unreasonable, treasury regulations will be sustained). Treasury regulations will be overruled only for
significant reasons, since such regulations represent the construction of the revenue statutes
by those charged with interpreting the Code. See id.at 501; Fawcus Machine Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S 375, 378 (1931) (important reason needed to overturn treasury regulation).
A treasury regulation which alters congressional intent will be held void. See World Serv.
Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 247, 250 (8th Cir. 1983).
30. See PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS UNIT, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1982/83 424 (1982). The Office of the Assistant
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rulings, which are published interpretations of the tax laws, as an expression of the expertise of the agency empowered to administer the tax laws,
i.e., the IRS. 3 Nevertheless, neither the courts nor the Secretary of the
Treasury are bound by revenue rulings because such rulings do not have
the force of law,32 and a revenue ruling will have no effect if it alters the
congressional intent of a statute 33 or conflicts with a court's interpretation
of a statute.34
Even though the courts can disregard a revenue ruling, many cases uphold the authority of the IRS to interpret the Internal Revenue Code.35
Secretary "assists the Secretary and Deputy Secretary in the formulation and execution" of
the tax policies. See id at 427. Revenue rulings do not have the "force and effect of treasury
regulations". See 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d)(1982); see also Sims v. United States, 252
F.2d 434, 438 (4th Cir. 1958) (revenue rulings are not "formally approved or promulgated by
Secretary of Treasury"), af'd, 359 U.S. 108 (1959).
31. See, e.g., Carle Found. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1193, 1195 (7th Cir. 1979) (revenue rulings accorded weight), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); McMartin Indus., Inc. v.
Vinal, 441 F.2d 1274, 1275-76 (8th Cir. 1971) (revenue rulings entitled to great weight in
interpretive process); United States v. Hall, 398 F.2d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 1968) (much weight
given to revenue ruling in interpretive process); see also Whittemore v. United States, 383
F.2d 824, 830 n.9 (8th Cir. 1967) (regulations enacted under "legislative authority, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7805 (1964)," and are therefore entitled to substantial weight in "interpretive process");
Economy Sav. & Loan Co. v. Comm'r, 158 F.2d 472, 474 (6th Cir. 1946) (great weight). The
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated that rulings express the studied view of the
agency whose duty is to carry out the tax statute. See Miami Beach First Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 443 F.2d 475, 478 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971). The Fifth
Circuit, moreover, stated that revenue rulings are the official interpretations of our tax statutes and should be accorded weight. See Maccy's Jewelry Corp. v. United States, 387 F.2d
70, 72 (5th Cir. 1967). But see Biddle v. Comm'r, 302 U.S. 573, 582 (1938) (when interpreting a tax statute a ruling is of limited help).
32. See Stubbs, Overbeck & Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 445 F.2d 1142, 1146 (5th Cir.
1971) (rulings have interpretive value but not binding on courts or Secretary); Sims v.
United States, 252 F.2d 434, 438 (4th Cir. 1958) (rulings not promulgated by Secretary of
Treasury, not binding on Secretary or the courts), affid, 359 U.S. 108 (1959); United States
v. Bennett, 186 F.2d 407, 410 (5th Cir. 1951) (rulings have no more binding or legal effect
than opinion of any lawyer).
33. See Neuberger v. Comm'r, 311 U.S. 83, 89 (1940) (ruling cannot conflict with congressional intent); Conway County Farmers Ass'n v. United States, 588 F.2d 592, 600 (8th
Cir. 1978) (ruling cannot alter scope of statute).
34. See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) (under statutory authority administrative agency may possess power to "prescribe rules and regulations"
to effectuate intent of Congress, but regulation which attempts to invade exclusive congressional power by creating laws "merely nullity"); see also United States v. Martin, 337 F.2d
171, 175-76 (8th Cir. 1964) (revenue ruling conflicting with statute is nullity); First Ky. Co. v.
Gray, 190 F. Supp. 824, 825 (W.D. Ky. 1960) (ruling entitled to respect but fails if conflicts
with law as interpreted by courts).
35. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Portland Cement Co., 450 U.S. 156, 169 (1981) (Secretary of
Treasury, not courts, vested with such authority); United States v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546,
550 (1973) (not business of courts to administer tax laws since Congress vested such author-

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol15/iss2/9

6

Chamblee: IRS Acted within Its Authority in Determining That Racially Discr

1984)

CASENOTES

The Supreme Court in United States v. Correll, 6 for example, declared
that Congress delegated to the Commissioner and not to the courts the
authority to prescribe "all needful rules and regulations" for the administration and enforcement of the Internal Revenue Code.37 The judiciary's
duty, according to the Court is to insure that the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue acted
within the limits of his authority and reasonably construed
38
the tax laws.
Courts have also upheld the Commissioner's interpretations of tax-exemptions on the basis that such tax benefits must conform to public policy.39 The Supreme Court has emphasized that Congress, in allowing
deductions of business expenses, did not intend to allow the business to
circumvent public policy.4" Charitable tax-exemptions, like other tax-exemptions, have been subject to public policy limitations.4 Courts have
denied tax-exempt status to various private trusts which were determied by
the IRS to provide a private, rather than a public, benefit.4 2 Furthermore,
ity in Secretary of Treasury); Comm'r v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948)
(Commissioner charged with administration of statutes).
36. 389 U.S. 299 (1967). The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue ruled that a taxpayer can deduct "traveling expenses" incurred on a business trip only if the trip requires
the taxpayer to stop and sleep. See id at 299.
37. See id at 307. The Court stated that the tax-exemption statute, section 162(a)(2) of
the Internal Revenue Code, did not encompass every business expense incurred in traveling.
See id at 302. The Court also declared that the Commissioner achieved substantial fairness
in construing the statute. See id at 303.
38. See id. at 307.
39. See Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958) (judicial action requires
that, when possible, public policy of state is not thwarted).
40. See id at 31-32 (Court upheld IRS revised policy founded upon public policy interpretation of tax-exemption statute). Courts have consistently held that deductions of fines
and penalties will contravene public policy because to allow such deductions would thwart
the intent of the legislature. See, e.g., United States v. Jaffray, 97 F.2d 488, 493 (8th Cir.
1938) (Commissioner disallowed deduction from ordinary business expenses and his ruling
presumed correct), afd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Bertelsen & Petersen
Eng'g Co., 306 U.S. 276 (1939); Tunnel R. Co. v. Comm'r, 61 F. 2d 166, 174 (8th Cir. 1932)
(not congressional intent that carrier should have any advantage, by way of deduction of
imposed penalties); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Comm'r, 47 F.2d 990, 991 (7th Cir. 1931)
(would be unjustifiable to allow business expense deductions for fines imposed for violation
of public policy); see also Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Comm'r, 47 F.2d 178, 180 (2nd
Cir. 1931) (only "ordinary and necessary business expenses" may be deducted; fines paid by
taxpayer not such expenses); Great N. Ry. v. Comm'r, 40 F.2d 372, 373 (8th Cir. 1930)
(expenses are not of type that fall within "statutory definition of deductible operating expenses"). In Great Northern Ry., the court declared that it was not the congressional intent
that the petitioner "should have any advantage" or reduction of the penalties which were
incurred. See id at 373.
41. See Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U.S. 362, 358 (1870). "Charity is generally defined as a
gift for a public use. Such is its legal meaning." Id at 358.
42. See Crellin v. Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 1152, 1156 (1942) (petitioner had created private
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in 1924 the Supreme Court recognized the requirement that "charitable
institutions" must provide a benefit to the public before receiving tax-exempt status. 3 Congress reinforced this public benefit theory and declared
that the exemptions granted to charitable organizations are justified by the
theory that the government is relieved of certain public financial burdens
and the general welfare is benefited by the activities of such organizations;
thus, the government receives "compensation for the loss in revenues."'
In Bob Jones University v. United States,45 the Supreme Court confronted the issue of whether the IRS exceeded its statutory authority by
issuing a revenue ruling denying petitioner tax-exempt status under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code.' The Reagan Administration
had placed the Court in a sensitive position by maintaining that the IRS
trust and sought tax-exemption); James Sprunt Benevolent Trust v. Comm'r, 20 B.T.A. 19,
24-25 (1930) (must give benefit which is not private). In Crellin, the court declared that the
purpose of the trust was not charitable and thus no deduction was allowed. See Crellin v.
Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 1152, 1156 (1942).
43. See Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) (exemption is made for benefit given to public). The Court stated that the exemption is not afforded
when an organization conducts itself for a merely private gain. See id at 581.
44. See H.R. Rep. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 19 (1938) (tax-exemptions based on
public policy).
45. - U.S. 103 S. Ct. 2017, 76 L. Ed. 2d 157 (1983). Although the University
revised its admissions policy in 1975, the University still practiced racial discrimination. See
id at -. 103 S. Ct. at 2023, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 166. The University argued that, after revising
its policy, it allowed all races to enroll, subject only to certain restrictions. See id.at - 103
S. Ct. 2036, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 182. The Court stated that any ban on admission founded upon
a racially discriminatory motive was still discrimination and thus contravened established
public policy and court precedent. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2036, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 182.
103 S. Ct. at 2025, 76 L. Ed. at 169; see also 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3)
46. See id at -_,
(1976 & Supp. V 1982) (categories of tax-exempt status given). The Court concluded that
the IRS' interpretation was within the statutory powers of the IRS. See id at -, 103 S.Ct.
at 2030, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 175-76. The University's first point of attack against the action of
the IRS was that the IRS erroneously determined that racially discriminatory admission
policies of private schools violated public policy. See id at - 103 S.Ct. at 2031, 76 L. Ed.
2d at 176. The Court stated that institutions which racially discriminate confer no public
benefit within the legislative meaning behind section 501(c)(3). See id at __ 103 S.Ct. at
2031, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 176. The University also argued that the IRS had exceeded its statutory authority in issuing the revenue ruling, regardless of whether racial discrimination violates public policy. See id.at __ 103 S.Ct. at 2031, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 176. The Court declared
that the IRS had acted within its authority when it issued the revenue ruling interpreting
sections 501(c)(3) and 170. See id at _ 103 S.Ct. at 2032, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 178. The
University made the additional argument that the IRS policy cannot apply when the racial
103 S.Ct. at
discrimination is supported by a sincerely held religious belief. See id.at ___,
2034, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 180. The free exercise clause of the first amendment, the Court stated,
is not absolute. See id at__, 103 S. Ct. at 2034, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 180. Furthermore, according
to the Court, although denial of tax-exempt status will have an impact on the University,
such denial will not prevent the school from "observing their religious tenets." See id at
103 S.Ct. at 2035, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 181.
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4
was without authority to issue Revenue Ruling 71-447. '

Nevertheless,

Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, declared that the IRS had
not exceeded its authority and thus adopted the IRS' view that to qualify
for tax-exemption under section 501(c)(3), an entity must come within one
of the eight categories enumerated by section 501(c)(3) and must not act
contrary to public policy. 48 In arriving at its decision, the Court looked to
the congressional purposes surrounding the Internal Revenue Code's taxexemptions and also to the origins of tax-exemptions. 49 Charitable tax-

exemptions, the Court declared, affect all taxpayers and such exemptions
50
are justified by the public benefit which such entities confer on society.

Therefore, according to the Court, when an entity fails to confer a public
benefit or contravenes public policy, the reasons for affording the entity

47. See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. Revenue Ruling 71-447 provides in pertinent part: "[A] school not having a racially nondiscriminatory policy as to students is not
'charitable' within the common law concepts reflected in sections 170 and 501(c)(3) of the
Code and in other relevant Federal statutes and accordingly does not qualify as an organization exempt from Federal income tax. See Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, 231.
48. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S. -, -, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2030-31, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 157, 175-76 (1983). Under section 501 (c) (3) the eight enumerated categories entitled
to tax-exempt status are: religious, charitable, scientific, literary, and educational institutions, institutions fostering national or international amateur sporting events, institutions
which perform tests for public safety, and institutions which operate for the prevention of
cruelty to children and animals. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (1976 & Supp. V 1982). The
University argued that the only requirement of any organization is that it fall within one of
the eight categories. See id.at __ 103 S.Ct. at 2025, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 169. The Court
declared, however, that section 501(c)(3) must be analyzed within the framework of the
Code and read in light of congressional intent. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2026, 76 L. Ed. 2d
at 170. The Court declared that a reading of section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code
reveals that congressional intent was to afford tax-exemption only to institutions performing
"charitable purposes." See id at __ 103 S. Ct. at 2026 n.11, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 170 n. 11. Such a
reading, the Court found, leads to the conclusion that institutions which violate public policy are not entitled to tax-exempt status. See id.at _ 103 S. Ct. at 2026, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 171.
The opinion in Bob Jones University,written by Chief Justice Burger, was joined by Associate Justices William J. Brennan Jr., Thurgood Marshall, Byron R. White, Harry A. Blackmun, John Paul Stevens, and Sandra Day O'Connor. See id at - 103 S.Ct. at 2036, 76 L.
Ed. 2d at 182. Associate Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., wrote a separate concurring opinion.
See id.at - 103 S.Ct. at 2036, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 182. A dissenting opinion was written by
Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist. See id at - 103 S.Ct. at 2039, 76 L. Ed. 2d at
186.
49. See id at - 103 S.Ct. at 2036, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 171 (must look at congressional
intent in analyzing sections of Internal Revenue Code). The Court found that tax-exemptions were originally afforded to institutions "beneficial to the social order of the country."
See id at - 103 S.Ct. at 2026, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 171.
50. See id.at _ 103 S.Ct. at 2028, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 173. When such exemptions are
given, other taxpayers are indirect donors. See id at __ 103 S.Ct. at 2028, 76 L. Ed. 2d at
173.
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tax-exempt status are abrogated." The Court stated that the IRS should
not be expected to ignore sound public policy and blindly grant tax-exemptions. 2 Furthermore, the Court concluded, the IRS must first look to
the Internal Revenue Code to determine whether the entity qualifies under
section 501(c)(3); it then becomes the duty of the IRS to determine whether
that entity violates public policy.5 3 The Court held that petitioner violated
established public policy and the IRS acted within its authority in revoking
petitioner's tax-exempt status.5
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, did not adopt the majority's
conclusion that entitlement to tax-exemption should rest on a "public benefit" theory. 5 According to Justice Powell, the IRS is empowered to administer tax laws and collect revenue and should not act to promote public
policy. 6 Justice Powell concluded that the language of the tax-exempt
statute does not require refusal of tax-exempt status to private schools that
discriminate.57
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist declared that the majority
vested the IRS with broad powers which Congress had reserved for itself 8

51. See id at., 103 S. Ct. at 2031, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 176. The Court stated that racially
discriminatory educational institutions confer no public benefit. See id at -, 103 S Ct. at
2031, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 176. Furthermore, according to the Court, the organizations' activities
and purposes cannot go against the "common community conscience." See id at _, 103 S.
Ct. at 2029, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 174.
52. See id at _, 103 S. Ct. at 2032, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 177-78.
53. See id at . 103 S. Ct. at 2025, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 169. To qualify for tax-exemption,
according to the IRS and the Court, the institution must first fall within one of the categories
enumerated by section 501(c)(3). See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2025, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 169. The
Court adopted the position of the IRS that, after an institution comes within one of the eight
categories of section 501(c)(3), it must also prove to be an institution not contrary to public
policy before it can be accorded tax-exempt status. See id at __ 103 S. Ct. at 2025, 76 L. Ed.
2d at 169.
54. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2036, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 182 (IRS properly applied Revenue
Ruling 71-447 to Bob Jones University).
55. See id at , 103 S. Ct. at 2037, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 184 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring in
part, concurring in judgment).
56. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2039, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 186 (Powell, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment). The Court, Justice Powell concluded, has often agreed with limiting the authority of an agency to areas in which they possess expertise. See id at - 103 S.
Ct. 2039, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 186 (Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment).
57. See id at _ 103 S. Ct. at 2036, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 183 (Powell, J., concurring in part,
concurring in judgment). According to Justice Powell, the petitioners came within the language of the tax-exemption statute. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2036, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 183
(Powell, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment). Furthermore, Justice Powell declared that the "contours of public policy" should not be established by the judges or the
courts, but by Congress. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2039, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 186.
58. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2044, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 193 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Justice Rehnquist declared that the interpretation given section 501(c)(3) by the IRS and
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In addition, Justice Rehnquist disagreed with the construction given to
section 501(c)(3) by the IRS and the majority. 9 Finding that Congress
had set forth the requirements of section 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status, Justice Rehnquist professed that nowhere does there exist an additional public policy requirement.6"
The fact that the Reagan Administration did not support the action
taken by the IRS and refused to send counsel to the Supreme Court to
defend the IRS' position made the decision in Bob Jones University a politically sensitive question. 6 The Court, however, was presented with a
question of constitutional importance,6 2 specifically, whether the adminis-

adopted by the Court is unsupported by "statutory language and legislative history." See id.
at -, 103 S. Ct. at 2044, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 193 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice
Rehnquist refused to adopt the Court's conclusion that Congress had acquiesced to the IRS
interpretation. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2043-44, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 192 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority acknowledged that the courts are reluctant to interpret inaction on
the part of Congress as acquiescence. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2033, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 178.
The majority, however, found that Congress had affirmatively acquiesced in the IRS interpretation of section 501(c)(3) when Congress enacted section 501(i) of the Internal Revenue
Code. Act of October 20, 1976, Pub. L. 94-568, 90 Stat. 2697 (1976); see Bob Jones Univ. v.
United States, - U.S. - - 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2033, 76 L. Ed. 2d 157, 179 (1983).
59. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S. _ __ 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2040, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 157, 188 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist declared that Congress
defined the requirements for tax-exemption under section 501(c)(3). See id. at - 103 S. Ct.
at 2040, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 188. Justice Rehnquist also disagreed with the majority's proposition that section 170 of the Internal Revenue Code is helpful in interpreting section
501(c)(3). See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2040, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 188 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
60. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2024, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 187 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
61. See Flygare, Supreme Court Hears Arguments on Tax Breaks/orRacially DiscriminatoryPrivate Schools, 64 PHI DELTA KAPPA 369, (1983) (due to refusal of Reagan Administration to send counsel, court appointed special counsel). William T. Coleman, who was
appointed by the Court stated that an institution which violates "fundamental public policy"
does not qualify for tax-exemption under the Code. See id at 369. In 1982, President Reagan endeavored to revoke the position taken by the IRS with regard to tax-exemption. See
N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1983, at Al, col. 4. The action of the Reagan Administration in response to the policy position taken by the IRS became symbolic of the Administration's
departure from "civil rights policies of the recent past." See N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1983, at
Al, col. 4; see also Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S. _ _ 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2025 n.9,
76 L. Ed. 2d 157, 169 n.9 (1983) (government continued to maintain that IRS had no authority to issue revenue ruling); Flygare, Supreme Court Hears Arguments on Tax Breaks/or
Racially DiscriminatoryPrivateSchools, 64 PHI DELTA KAPPA 369 (1983) (Reagan Administration declared IRS had no congressional authority to deny "tax-exemptions to racially
discriminatory schools").
62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Taxation is purely a legislative function. See
National Cable Television Ass'n Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 340 (1974). Under the
Constitution, Congress is prohibited from delegating essential legislative functions. See
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. Unied States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935). Congress can delegate
authority as to execution of the law, but such authority must be "exercised under and in
pursuance of the law." See Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928). The
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trative agency empowered to administer the tax laws had attempted to
shape public policy and thus had exceeded its bounds of authority.6 3 As
pointed out by Justice Powell in his concurring opinion, the courts have
consistently limited an agency's authority to those areas in which the
agency has statutory power. 64 There can be no dispute that the IRS is
empowered to administer and interpret the Internal Revenue Code. 65 Any
dispute lies in the fine line to be drawn between interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code and enactment of the nation's tax laws. 66 As to the
latter, the IRS is without authority because no administrative
agency can
67
exercise the legislative power of creating our nation's law.
The courts have also consistently estopped agencies that seek to promote
public policy. 68 Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Bob Jones University, recConstitution demands, however, that the three branches of government remain free from
control or influence. See Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935); see
also F. COPPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 31-32 (1982) (administrative
agencies which claim authority vested in legislature or courts violate essentials of
Constitution).
63. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S 1 __ 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2021, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 157, 164 (1983). The sensitivity of the issues involved in Bob Jones University is
further revealed by the statement made by Reverend Bob Jones, Jr., immediately following
the date of the decision, that we are "in a bad fix when eight evil old men and one vain and
foolish woman can speak a verdict on American liberties." See N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1983,
at A22, col. 4. Furthermore, Reverend Jones reiterated that his school's policies are based
upon the Bible which does not permit racial mixing. See N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1983, at A22,
col. 4.
64. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2039, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 186 (Powell, J., concurring). An
agency's duty to enforce legislation is limited to enforcement of only those statutes directed
at the agency. See Community Television v. Gottfried, __ U.S. - .. , 103 S. Ct. 885, 893
n.17, 74 L. Ed. 2d 705, 717 n.17 (1983). See generally Schwartz, Administrative Law Cases
During 1979, 32 AD.L. REV. 411, 413 (1980) (limiting agencies to statutory limits is the
"principle administrative law function" of courts).
65. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7801-7810 (1976) (statutes define scope of authority of officers of
IRS); see also 26 U.S.C. § 7802 (1976) (Commissioner of the Internal Revenue vested with
power to perform "such duties and powers as may be prescribed by the Secretary"). See
generally PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS UNIT, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1982/83 435 (1982) (sets out divisions of IRS).
66. See Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935). (essential
legislative functions vested in Congress cannot be delegated); see also F. COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS 31-32 (1982) (administrative agencies cannot deprive
Congress of its constitutional authority).
67. See Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936). "The power
of an administrative officer or board to administer a federal statute and to prescribe rules
and regulations to that end is not the power to make law...." Id at 134; see also Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 407 (1928) (important distinction exists between
delegation of authority to make laws and giving authority to execute the laws); 26 U.S.C.
§§ 7801-7810 (1976) (statutes establish scope of authority of IRS which does not include
authority to create laws).
68. See, e.g., NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S. 662, 670 (1976) (FPC not
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ognized the importance of prohibiting an agency from creating "fundamental public policy."6 9 As pointed out by the majority, however, Justice
Rehnquist failed to take notice of section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue
Code which indicates that the congressional intent was to afford tax-exemptions only to those who perform "charitable" functions.7 °
Furhermore, it has been recognized by Congress and declared by the
courts, in a long line of cases, that tax-exemptions are burdened with a
"public benefit" theory.7 ' Congressional intent and court precedent, therefore, preclude the rejection of the "public benefit" theory, which, if disregarded, would result in the determination that the IRS had exceeded its
scope of authority in Bob Jones University as well as in 72numerous cases
upholding IRS determinations based on "public benefit.
Some of the disagreement in Bob Jones University stems from the majority's statement that the IRS has denied tax-exemptions to other organizations due to a failure to fulfill a "public benefit., 73 The problem lies in the
fact that the majority uses as support cases involving treasury regula-

empowered to create public policy); New Haven Inclusion Cases, 399 U.S. 392, 432 (1970)
(Commissioner of rail transportation system cannot create public policy); United States v.
Lowden, 308 U.S. 225, 230 (1938) (Commissioner's authority does not involve public
interest).
69. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S. - - 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2044, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 157, 193 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist emphasized the statement by Congressman Ashbrook that "[T]he IRS has no authority to create public policy."
See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2044, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 192 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2026 n.li, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 170 n.ll. The majority inBob
Jones University concluded that Justice Rehnquist's argument failed to recognize the fact
that section 170(c) of the Internal Revenue Code clearly defines the term "charitable contribution" which is the basis of section 501(c)(3) of the Code. See id.at - 103 S.Ct. at 2026
n.ll, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 170 n.l.
71. See, e.g., Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924)
(exemption not available when organization acts for private gain; must afford public benefit); Crellin v. Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 1152, 1156 (1942) (trust must be "charitable"); James
Sprunt Benevolent Trust v. Comm'r, 20 B.T.A. 19, 24-25 (1930) (court found no benefit
given to public thus no entitlement to tax-exemption); see also H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th
Cong., 3rd Sess. 19 (1938) (compensation given to government when tax-exemptions are
granted because government displaces certain financial burdens and public is benefited).
72. See, e.g., Tank Truck Rentals v. Comm'r, 356 U.S. 30, 35 (1958) (Court concluded
public policy of state should not be thwarted); Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores,
263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) (exemption denied because not "public benefit"); Crellin v.,
Comm'r, 46 B.T.A. 1152, 1156 (1942) (exemption denied by IRS due to no "public benefit"
and upheld by court); see also James Sprunt Benevolent Trust v. Comm'r, 20 B.T.A. 19, 2425 (1930) (court upheld IRS determination that only private benefit was conferred). See
generally Kain v. Gibboney, 101 U.S. 362, 365 (1879) (charity is gift for public benefit).
73. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S. - _ 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2031, 76 L.
Ed. 2d 157, 177 (1983) (Court stated there are "other instances [where] the IRS had denied
charitable exemptions" due to failure to provide "public benefit").
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5
tions,7 4 while Bob Jones University resulted from an IRS revenue ruling."
Although the courts give treasury regulations more weight than revenue
question remains the same, i.e., did the agency exceed its
rulings,76 the
77

authority?

The authority of the IRS, derived from Congress, includes interpretation
of the nation's tax laws.7" Even though the IRS is not empowered with
authority to create "public policy," 79 the majority concluded that the IRS
was not acting to create public policy; it was simply recognizing congressional intent as required."0 Moreover, it cannot be doubted that racial discrimination contravenes public policy. 8 ' To grant tax-exemptions to
institutions that practice such discrimination would ignore a broad but

74. See id at __ 103 S. Ct. at 2031, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 177.
75. See id.at _ 103 S. Ct. at 2025, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 169.
76. See, e.g., Comm'r v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948) (weighty
reason needed to overrule treasury regulation; unless unreasonable will be sustained); Fawcus Mach. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 375, 378 (1931) (treasury regulation overturned
only for weighty reason); Sims v. United States, 252 F.2d 434, 438 (4th Cir. 1958) (revenue
rulings not formally approved or promulgated by Secretary of Treasury), aff'd, 359 U.S. 108
(1959). See generally PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS UNIT, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL REGISTER, THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 1982/83 427 (1982) (Secretary of Treasury and Deputy Secretary formulate tax policies). Revenue rulings do not have the "force
and effect of treasury regulations." See 26 C.F.R. § 601.601(d)(2)(v)(d) (1982).
77. See, e.g., Carle Found. v. United States, 611 F.2d 1192, 1195 (7th Cir. 1979) (weight
given revenue rulings), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); McMartin Indus., Inc. v. Vinal, 441
F.2d 1274, 1275-76 (8th Cir. 1971) (weight given to revenue ruling); Whittemore v. United
States, 383 F.2d 824, 830 n.9 (8th Cir. 1967) (regulation promulgated under 26 U.S.C. § 7805
(1964), and is given great weight); see also Maccey's Jewelry Corp. v. United States, 387
F.2d 70, 72 (5th Cir. 1967) (weight accorded ruling since "official interpretation by service").
A ruling cannot abrogate the Congressional intent of a tax statute. See Neuberger v.
Comm'r, 311 U.S. 83, 89 (1940). A ruling cannot alter the scope of a statute. See Conway
County Farmers Ass'n v. United States, 588 F.2d 592, 600 (8th Cir. 1978). A regulation
must do no more than interpret and apply Congressional intent. See Manhattan Gen.
Equip. Co. v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 129, 134-35 (1936) (power of administrative agency is not
"power to make law" but power to administer intent of Congress as "expressed by the
statute").
78. See, e.g., World Serv. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 471 F.2d 247, 250 (8th Cir.
1973) (IRS vested with authority to issue regulations); United States v. Weber Paper Co.,
302 F.2d 199, 201 (8th Cir. 1963) (IRS vested with authority to issue letter rulings); Tax
Analysts & Advocates v. Internal Revenue Serv., 362 F. Supp. 1298, 1302 (D.D.C. 1973)
(IRS vested with authority to issue revenue rulings).
_, 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2039, 76 L.
79. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S.
concurring in part, concurring in judgment) (business
Ed. 2d 157, 185-86 (1983) (Powell, J.,
of the IRS is to produce revenues).
80. See id at - 103 S.Ct. at 2032, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 177. The IRS, according to the
majority, is guided by the Code. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2032, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 177.
103 S.Ct. at 2029, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 174. Each individual has the right
81. See id at "not to be segregated on racial grounds." See Copper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 19 (1958).
Discriminatory private schools, though exercising an educational function, contravene pub-
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overriding reason behind tax-exemptions, specifically, that such groups or
individuals
should receive no advantage from a violation of public
82
policy.
Although the majority's decision in Bob Jones University,83 written by
Chief Justice Burger, did not address the question of whether there should
be a distinction between public and private religious institutions,8 4 the majority's reasoning and the public policy theory behind granting tax-exemptions indicate that no line should be drawn and no distinction made

between such organizations.85 Whether the IRS can deny tax-exempt status to purely religious institutions which maintain racially discriminatory
policies is a question which remains unanswered after the decision in Bob
Jones University.86 The majority's adoption of the IRS position, that an

institution must fall within one of the eight enumerated categories of section 501(c)(3) and not act contrary to public policy, would indicate that the
IRS is empowered to deny tax-exempt status to purely religious institutions which racially discriminate.87 The first amendment to the Constitu88
tion, however, dictates that freedom of religion cannot be impaired.

Furthermore, even though the granting of tax-exemptions to purely reli-

lic policy since the educational function cannot be isolated from the discrimination. See
Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 468-69 (1973).
82. See, e.g., Tunnel R.R. v. Comm'r, 61 F.2d 166, 174 (8th Cir. 1932) (no advantage by
way of tax-deduction is afforded when one violates statute); Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. v.
Comm'r, 47 F.2d 990, 991 (7th Cir.1931) (fines imposed for violation of public policy are not
deductible, since no advantage afforded for such violation); Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v.
Comm'r, 47 F.2d 178, 179 (2nd Cir. 1931) (fines paid by taxpayer not deductible); see also
Great N. Ry. v. Comm'r, 40 F.2d 372, 373 (8th Cir. 1930) (Congress never intended that
taxpayer should have any advantage from unlawful activities).
83. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S._____ 103 S. Ct. 2017, 76 L. Ed. 2d
157 (1983).
84. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2035 n.29, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 181 n.29.
85. See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2029-30, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 174-75. The Court, without
making a distinction between public and private religious institutions, declared that "racial
discrimination in education violates a most fundamental national public policy, as well as
rights of individuals." See id at __ 103 S. Ct. at 2029, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 174. The Court in
Norwood, without drawing a distinction between public and private educational institutions,
declared that racially discriminatory educational practices exert "a pervasive influence on
the entire educational process." See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469 (1973); see also
H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3rd Sess. 19 (1938) (tax-exemptions based on public policy); Trinidad v. Sagrada Orden de Predicadores, 263 U.S. 578, 581 (1924) (exemption made
for benefit given to public).
86. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, - U.S. , 103 S. Ct. 2017, 2035 n.29, 76
L. Ed. 2d 157, 181 n.29 (1983).
87. See id at , 103 S. Ct. at 2032, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 177. Religious institutions "operated exclusively for religious" purposes fall within one of the eight categories specifically
enumerated in section 501(c)(3). See id at - 103 S. Ct. at 2021 n.1, 76 L. Ed. 2d at 164 n.1.
88. See U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
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gious organizations does not contravene the establishment clause of the
first amendment,8 9 it has been held that no tax-exemption can differentiate
between "types of religious belief."9 With respect to the agency's authority to make decisions which embrace public policy, the courts can draw no
arbitrary line but must examine the congressional intent surrounding the
statute interpreted by the agency and look to the statute which established
the agency's authority.9"
Since the IRS is the administrative agency empowered to administer
and interpret our nation's tax laws, the interpretation process requires the
IRS to take notice of established congressional intent. While the IRS cannot make laws aimed at eliminating a particular group from the purview of
a tax-exemption statute, the IRS can deny tax-exemptions to a group
which does not fulfill the congressional intent of a particular tax statute.
In order to inform taxpayers of its determinations, the IRS is empowered
to issue treasury regulations, revenue rulings, and letter rulings. The revenue ruling issued by the IRS regarding Bob Jones University was supported by congressional intent and by established court precedent.
Therefore, the determination of the Internal Revenue Service that the University failed to confer a "public benefit" and the subsequent revocation of
its tax-exempt status were actions within the statutory authority of the IRS.
William Chamblee
89. See Swallow v. United States, 325 F.2d 97, 98 (10th Cir. 1963) (per curiam) (first
amendment not contravened by allowing tax-exemptions for religious purposes), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 951 (1964).
90. See Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda, 315 P.2d 394, 406 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1957) (violation of Constitution to grant tax-exemptions which discriminate on
basis of religious belief).
91. See, e.g., Community Television v. Gottfried,

-

U.S. _,

,

103 S. Ct. 885, 893

n.17, 74 L. Ed. 2d 705, 717 n.17 (1983) (agency not empowered to enforce legislation outside
agency's authority); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 114-15 (1976) (limited function performed by Civil Service Commission); NAACP v. Federal Power Comm'n, 425 U.S.
662 665 (1976) (question is what authority Congress granted to agency). See generally Village of Silverlake v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 375 N.W. 2d 119, 112 (Wis. Ct. App.
1978) (administrative agencies have only statutory powers); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7801-7810 (1976)
(statutes define scope of authority of officers of the Internal Revenue Service).
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